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Abstract
We study the endogenous formation of upstream R&D networks in a vertically
related industry. We nd that, when upstream rms set prices, the complete net-
work that includes all rms emerges in equilibrium. In contrast, when upstream
rms set quantities, the complete network will arise but only if within-network R&D
spillovers are su¢ ciently low, while if R&D spillovers are su¢ ciently high, a par-
tial network arises. Interestingly, when upstream rms set prices, the equilibrium
network maximizes social welfare, while a conict between equilibrium and socially
optimal networks is likely to occur when upstream rms set quantities.
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1 Introduction
Over the last three decades, we have witnessed a substantial increase in the number of
R&D alliances between rms. Consistent evidence across the United States (Röller et
al., 2007), Europe (Kaiser, 2002) and Japan (Branstetter and Sakakibara, 1998) further
suggests that rms collaborate in order to share know-how and enhance their technolog-
ical capabilities.1 The recent upsurge in R&D alliances shows that hi-tech sector rms
increasingly prefer non-equity forms of collaboration, such as R&D networks, relative to
traditional, equity forms, such as research joint ventures (RJVs hereafter). For example,
Hagedoorn (2002) documents that in the major elds of technology, such as information
technology and pharmaceuticals, the number of newly established R&D alliances grew
steadily during the 1980s and 1990s, reaching an impressive total share of more than 90%,
while the share of RJVs declined to less than 10%.2
Further empirical evidence and stylized facts suggest that R&D alliances are often
established in the context of vertically related industries. For example, Cloodt et al.
(2006) nd that, in the computer industry, a substantial number of R&D alliances are
formed at the upstream market tier that is, among rms that do not trade directly with
consumers but instead supply key inputs. The principal motivation behind this observa-
tion is that individual rms nd it rather di¢ cult to develop technological capabilities
alone, so they prefer to collaborate with others and pool their know-how. In particular,
we have observed the formation of R&D alliances between producers of micro chips, such
as Intel, Motorola and Texas Instruments who are located upstream and supply their
inputs to personal computer manufacturers, such as IBM, Hewlett Packard, Sony, Dell
1The proliferation of R&D alliances is a phenomenon that has attracted the attention of policy makers,
managers and academics alike. This phenomenon has often been described, for instance, as the age of
alliance capitalism(e.g. Narula and Dysters, 2004, p. 200) or a frenzy of dealsbetween rms (e.g.
Caloghirou et al., 2003, p. 546).
2The main reason behind this diversity in evolution is that non-equity R&D partnerships, such as
R&D networks, allow for greater exibility, thereby enabling rms to innovate in several and often diverse
technological elds. On the contrary, although equity types of alliances, such as RJVs, are e¤ective in
limiting the opportunistic behaviour of research partners (Buckley and Casson, 1988), they are more
appropriate for less turbulent economic environments (i.e. medium or low-tech sectors), as they require
greater time to administer, establish and dissolve (Roijakers and Hagedoorn, 2006).
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and Compaq who are located downstream.
These observations raise a number of questions. First, what R&D network architec-
tures will emerge endogenously between upstream rms? Second, how do the incentives
to form R&D collaboration links depend on whether upstream rms set prices or quan-
tities? Third, what are the welfare e¤ects of the equilibrium R&D networks? Finally, in
light of the favorable treatment of R&D collaborations in the United States (Hagedoorn
et al., 2000) and the European Union (Luukkonen, 2002), can our model yield an insight
into issues relevant to policy-making?
To address these questions, we study an endogenous network formation model. We
envisage an industry with three upstream and three downstream rms, which are locked in
exclusive relations.3 The input produced by the upstream rms is used by their respective
downstream customers to produce a nal good. In line with the stylized facts above, the
upstream rms seek to reduce their costs by pursuing both process R&D investment and
the formation of collaborative links to pool R&D outputs with other rms.
In this environment, when upstream rms decide whether to establish an R&D link
between them, they anticipate how this will inuence the competitive strength of their
respective downstream customers. In turn, a more aggressive downstream rm sells more
output and thus can secure more prot for its upstream supplier. To put it slightly dif-
ferently, upstream rms compete against each other indirectly, through their downstream
customers.
Our results emerge from comparing the upstream rmsnetwork formation decisions
under two alternative assumptions regarding their behavior: setting prices versus setting
quantities. As far as the rst question above is concerned, we argue that the equilib-
3As noted by Milliou and Petrakis (2007) exclusive relations are a common feature of many industries.
For instance, auto-makers and suppliers of auto-parts, auto-makers and car dealers, petroleum rms and
gasoline stations often carry out their dealings through exclusive contracts. It may also worth noting that
exclusive relations often arise due to the presence of switching costs. Switching costs, in turn, are typically
observed when upstream rms sell inputs which are tailored for the specic needs of downstream rms.
At the same time, upstream and downstream rms may have jointly undertaken irreversible investments
that render the costs of trading with alternative partners prohibitively high. This situation is common in
the Japanese automobile industry, where downstream rms and their upstream suppliers undertake large
xed investments, such as investments in quality-control training, exible automation and information
ow mechanisms (Helper and Levine, 1992). In turn, such relation-specic investments work toward
preventing an upstream-downstream rm pair from breaking up.
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rium R&D networks between the upstream rms depend crucially on whether they set
prices or quantities as well as on the magnitude of within-network R&D spillovers. More
specically, under a price setting, we show that the complete R&D network that in-
cludes all rms emerges in equilibrium. Yet, under a quantity setting, the equilibrium
R&D network is ambiguous and depends on the size of within-network spillovers. In
particular, if spillovers are su¢ ciently low, a complete network will arise in equilibrium.
However, if spillovers are su¢ ciently high, the alternative, partial network will be formed
that includes two of the rms but excludes the third. Finally, for intermediate levels of
within-network spillovers, no network is strongly stable.
The intuition can be explained as follows. Consider a partial network under a price
setting. In that case, linked rms sell their inputs at lower prices than the isolated
rm because they enjoy greater access to lower costs through R&D. However, because
input prices are strategic complements, the decrease in the input prices of the linked
rms induces the isolated rm to lower its input price. But this discountharms the
downstream counterparts of the linked rms by increasing the intensity of competition
between themselves. As a result, the linked rms will benet by bringing the isolated one
into the R&D network in order to relax competition between downstream rms. Thus,
the complete R&D network emerges endogenously under a price setting.
Under a quantity setting, though, our analysis demonstrates the emergence of the
partial R&D network. In contrast to a price setting, the cost advantage of the linked
rms implies that they are able to increase their input sales. This leads to a contraction
of the input sales of the outsider (isolated) rm because input quantities are strategic
substitutes. Consequently, under certain conditions, we show that linked rms have no
incentive to expand their partial R&D network. Thus, the equilibrium network formations
might contain more R&D links under a price setting relative to a quantity setting, for
certain values of the spillover parameter. We conclude that the mode of the upstream
rmsbehavior  setting prices versus setting quantities  plays an important role in
explaining the structure of the equilibrium R&D network.
Regarding the second question posed earlier, our analysis suggests that, in the context
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of an upstream quantity setting, the incentives of upstream rms to form R&D links are
non-monotone with respect to the level of within-network R&D spillovers (i.e. initially
decreasing, then increasing). In contrast, under a price setting, the incentives to form
links are not inuenced by R&D spillovers. We also nd that an expansion of an upstream
rms R&D network causes its R&D investment to decline. Despite a lower individual
e¤ort, our subsequent analysis reveals that the equilibrium R&D networks secure a gen-
erally higher aggregate level of e¤ective R&D than any other network.4 The reason is
that more links imply that rms enjoy greater spillover opportunities, thereby o¤setting
the negative e¤ect on aggregate e¤ective R&D due to a lower individual e¤ort.
As far as the third question is concerned, we note that while a price setting is likely
to induce generally denser R&D networks, it is not apriori clear that this is an optimal
choice from a social viewpoint. Here our analysis conrms that, under a price setting,
the equilibrium network maximizes social welfare. However, under a quantity setting,
we uncover a potential conict between equilibrium and socially optimal networks. In
particular, equilibrium networks might contain fewer R&D links than is optimal from
a social viewpoint. Thus, our analysis suggests that the mode of the upstream rms
behavior (prices versus quantities) is as important for designing technology policy as the
size of within-network R&D spillovers.
The paper is structured as follows. In section 2, we place our paper within the
context of the relevant literature. Section 3 describes the key ingredients of our model
and, section 4, characterizes the upstream rmsdecision to form R&D networks both
under a price and a quantity setting. Section 5 analyzes the e¢ ciency properties of the
di¤erent networks in terms of social welfare. Section 6 discusses various aspects of our
results, focusing on policy implications and extensions to our model. Finally, section 7
concludes the paper.
4In the main body of the paper we slightly qualify this result. That is, when upstream rms set
prices, the complete network maximizes the aggregate level of e¤ective R&D, except if within-network
spillovers are su¢ ciently large, in which case the aggregate level of e¤ective R&D is higher in the star
than in the complete network.
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2 Related literature and contribution
Our paper contributes to two strands of literature. First, it contributes to the rapidly-
expanding literature on R&D networks. In this strand of literature, a pioneer study is
Goyal and Moraga-González (2001), who investigate the interaction between the extent
of product market competition and R&D network formation. The authors demonstrate
that, in a homogeneous-good market, intermediate levels of collaboration are desirable in
terms of industry prots and social welfare but complete networks are stable. When rms
compete in independent markets, though, this dilemma disappears: private and collective
incentives for R&D collaboration do always coincide under the complete network.
Closer in spirit to our paper is Mauleon, Sempere-Monerris and Vannetelbosch (2008),
who extend and enrich the relevant literature by studying the e¤ects of rm-level unions
on the stability and e¢ ciency of horizontal R&D networks.5 They show that, when rms
set their own wages, the partial R&D network arises in equilibrium provided that within-
network spillovers are su¢ ciently high. However, in the other polar case where unions
set wages, the partial network is no longer stable, and the alternative, complete network,
emerges in equilibrium. Moreover, this latter architecture does not Pareto-dominate the
corresponding partial network when rms settle wages, and vice versa.
Our paper, like that of Mauleon et al. (2008), can be thought of as an attempt to
develop the literature on R&D networks vertically. Yet, we depart from Mauleon et al.
(2008) in the following two key respects. First, our focus is di¤erent in that we are
interested in the network formation decisions of upstream rather than downstream rms.
Second, unlike previous studies, we also consider two alternative forms of the upstream
rmsbehavior a price setting and a quantity setting. Thus, the principal contribution
of this paper relates to the market tier where the R&D network is formed as well as the
mode of the upstream rmsstrategic behavior.6
5Recent studies on horizontal R&D networks also include Westbrock (2010), Zikos (2010), Zu, Dong,
Zhao and Zhang (2011) and Zirulia (2011).
6It is worth noting that R&D alliances are often followed by mergers and acquisitions (Hagedoorn
and Sadowski, 1999). Thus, in a dynamic environment, our analysis can be thought of as focusing on the
pre-merger phase, where rms seek to learn about their partnerscompetencies and quality of research
e¤orts. In this light, our study can also be seen in a broader perspective as complementing the growing
6
Second, our paper contributes to a sizeable literature on R&D cooperation in oligopoly.
While earlier studies focused on one-tier industries,7 recently, Banerjee and Lin (2001),
Attalah (2002) and Ishii (2004) investigated the (ambiguous) incentives to form research
joint ventures in vertically related industries. Banerjee and Lin (2001) examine the
incentives to establish vertical RJVs under di¤erent cost-sharing rules. The authors
show that the optimal RJV size is positively correlated with the R&D cost, the gains
from innovation and the market size. Attalah (2002) and Ishii (2004) extend the analysis
to consider horizontal R&D alliances in addition to vertical ones.
In this paper, we restrict our attention to the endogenous determination of upstream
R&D networks when upstream rms set either their input prices or quantities.8 This al-
lows us to shed some light on the extent of inter-rm collaboration decisions. Moreover,
unlike the literature on RJVs, which assumes that R&D investments are determined co-
operatively, the network approachthat we follow takes the view that R&D investments
are determined non-cooperatively, in private R&D labs.9 As explained in the Introduc-
tion, an R&D network is a non-equity form. Therefore, rms retain their own R&D labs
and agree to pool their R&D results by forming collaborative links.10
literature on upstream horizontal mergers including Horn and Wolinsky, (1988), Ziss (1995), Milliou and
Petrakis (2007).
7See, for example, dAspremont and Jacquemin (1988), Poyago-Theotoky (1995), Kamien, Muller
and Zang (1992), Suzumura (1992), Qiu (1997) and Amir (2000).
8In a similar vein, Kesavayuth and Zikos (2012) study the simultaneous emergence of upstream and
downstream R&D networks. Yet we depart from this paper in two important dimensions. First, the
framework studied in the present paper is less restrictive, in the sense that we do not require that
downstream rms and their input suppliers simultaneously establish horizontal R&D networks. Second,
we study the e¤ects of the upstream rmsbehavior (setting prices versus setting quantities) on their
network formation decisions as well as on market and societal outcomes.
9It is well known that R&D collaborations may be terminated early or may not meet the expectations
of research partners (see e.g. Narula and Hagedoorn, 1999; Podolny and Page, 1998). In light of
this observation, our assumption standard in the R&D network literature that collaborating rms
individually choose their R&D investments captures precisely a lack of trust between themselves. Our
focus on non-cooperative investment behaviour is also consistent with Caloghirou et al. (2003, p. 549),
among others, who point out that it is very di¢ cult, even impossible, to write complete contracts on
intangible assets such as R&D investments.
10It is worth noting that close in spirit to the network approach is the model of RJV competition in
the taxonomy by Kamien et al. (1992), which is an exception to the norm of R&D co-operation.
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3 Model
We consider a two-tier industry consisting of three upstream rms and three downstream
rms denoted, respectively, by Ui and Di, with i = 1; 2; 3 see Figure 1, left panel.11
One could think of the upstream and the downstream rms as being, respectively, input
suppliers and nal good manufacturers. Downstream rms are endowed with constant
returns to scale technologies that transform one unit of input to one unit of output.
Moreover, there is an exclusive relation between Ui and Di.12 Hence, the input produced
by each upstream rm is used by its respective downstream customer to produce a nal
good.
Each downstream rm Di faces the following (inverse) demand function:13
p = a P3i=1 qi: (1)
Each downstream rm faces no other cost than the input price (wi) to its exclusive
supplier. Thus trading is conducted through linear wholesale price contracts.14
Each upstream rm faces an initially constant marginal cost of production c, with
11This is the smallest number of rms that allows us to study asymmetric networks (i.e. partial and
star networks) tractably. We note that, as Goyal and Moraga-González (2001), Mauleon et al. (2008)
point out, a general analysis of asymmetric networks would be especially challenging, though we return
to this issue in section 6.
12This kind of exclusivity is a standard assumption in the vertical relations literature (see e.g. Milliou
and Petrakis, 2007, and the references therein). As Milliou and Petrakis (2007) mention, the latter can
result from various sources. For instance, when the upstream rms produce inputs which are tailored for
specic nal good manufacturers, there may be irreversible R&D investments that create lockin e¤ects
and high switching costs.In section 6 we also discuss what would happen if we allow for non-exclusive
relations.
13Linear product demand is a simplifying assumption which is typical in the R&D network literature.
We further cast our analysis in the context of a homogeneous-product market in order to allow two
empirically relevant and opposing forces to drive the rmsnetwork formation decisions: e¢ ciency
improvement (a positive e¤ect) that subsequently triggers increased competition between the upstream
rms  a negative e¤ect (which operates through the corresponding downstream rms). This trade-
o¤ between cooperation and competition is consistent with empirical evidence reported in OECD
(2001).
14This assumption allows us to concentrate on the main strategic features of a price and a quantity
setting (by sidestepping any additional instruments, i.e. a xed fee, that may be available on the part of
the upstream rms in their dealings with their downstream customers). If, however, upstream rms can
use a non-linear pricing scheme that takes the form of a two-part tari¤, they will internalise perfectly the
prot of their downstream customers, thus yielding predictions very similar to one-tier models of R&D
networks (e.g. Goyal and Moraga-González, 2001).
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0  c < a (see e.g. dAspremont and Jacquemin, 1988).15 Upstream rm i, by investing
kx2i , k > 0 in process R&D can attain unit production cost c   xi, where xi is rm
is own R&D output.16 For simplicity, we set k = 1 which ensures nonnegativity of all
variables. Note that the R&D cost function reects diminishing returns to scale to R&D
expenditures. Moreover, each upstream rm can establish collaborative links and further
reduce its marginal cost by pooling R&D outputs with other upstream rms.
The e¤ectiveR&D investment, Xi, represents the overall reduction in rm is mar-
ginal cost due to R&D. It is obtained from rm is own R&D output, xi, and from the
research outputs of rms connected with i, which are partially absorbed depending on
the extent of within-network R&D spillovers ,  2 (0; 1].
In a triopoly, depending on the R&D links established between the upstream rms,
four distinct R&D network architectures may arise see Figure 1, right panel.
Input
suppliers
Final good
manufacturers
Network(s)
The star network
The complete networkThe empty network
The partial network
1
3
2 1
1
3
3
1
3
2
2 2
Figure 1: Industry structure (left panel) and networks architectures (right panel)
In the empty network, there are no links. Thus the overall marginal cost of each
upstream rm is given by:
ci(g
e) = c  xi, i 2 f1; 2; 3g: (2)
15We assume that upstream rms face (ex ante) identical marginal costs. These costs are then deter-
mined endogenously and, thus, in equilibrium, may di¤er across rms depending on the exact network
architecture as well as the place a rm occupies in it.
16Deroian and Gannon (2006) shift the focus from a setting of process R&D to one of product R&D.
They show that the latter yields qualitatively similar results with the more common setting of process
R&D used by others, at least for su¢ ciently homogeneous products.
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All other network architectures contain links between rms. In the complete network,
each rm is connected with the other two rms. Marginal costs are thus given by:
ci(g
c) = c  xi   (xj + xk), i 6= j 6= k, i; j; k 2 f1; 2; 3g. (3)
This implies that each (linked) rm can get access to its partnersR&D stocks at a rate
 2 (0; 1].17 Thus, in the complete network, the e¤ective R&D investment of rm i is
Xi = xi + (xj + xk).
In the partial network, there is only one collaborative link. To x ideas (and w.l.o.g.)
assume that rms 1 and 2 maintain this link. The ensuing marginal costs in this network
structure are:
Insiders: ci(gp) = c  xi   xj, i 6= j, i; j 2 f1; 2g,
Outsider: c3(gp) = c  x3: (4)
Finally, in the star network, like the partial network, there are two types of rms: a
hub and two spokes. The hub has two links, one with each of the two spoke rms. In
turn, the spokes have a direct link with the hub as well as an indirect link with each
other. To capture this relatively large distance within the network between spoke rms,
we assume that they can benet from each others R&D stock at a rate 
2
(Mauleon et
al., 2008).18 Let rm 1 be the hub and rms 2 and 3 be the spokes. Ensuing marginal
17Goyal and Moraga-González (2001) focus instead on public spillovers. They assume that when a
link is formed, partner rms can fully benet from each others R&D stock, i.e.  = 1. In addition,
non-collaborating (or indirectly connected) rms can benet from the R&D stocks of collaborating rms,
but at a lower rate, which is assumed equal to ,  2 [0; 1). We note that both spillover processes yield
analogous predictions regarding the equilibrium R&D network formations (see Mauleon et al., 2008;
Goyal and Moraga-González, 2001).
18We assume that within-network R&D spillovers depend on the distance between a pair of collabo-
rating rms, i and j. In turn, this distance is measured by the number of links, t(ij), in the shortest
path between i and j. This means that, if rms i and j are directly linked, then t(ij) = 1; while if i and
j are spoke rms, who are indirectly linked via the hub, then t(ij) = 2. We set t(ij) =1 to denote the
absence of a path between the pair of rms i and j. Thus, following Mauleon et al. (2008), in a network
g, the overall marginal cost of producing the input for rm Ui is given by ci(g) = c xi 
h
xj
t(ij) +
xk
t(ik)
i
.
We note that the idea of spillovers decreasing with increasing distance has also been used in related con-
texts. For instance, Piga and Poyago-Theotoky (2005) develop a Hotelling-type model, where spillovers
are location-specic; that is, the further apart rms are located the less they can benet from each
others e¤orts in R&D.
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costs are:
Hub: c1(gs) = c  x1   (xi + xj); i 6= j; i; j 2 f2; 3g;
Spokes: ci(gs) = c  xi   x1   
2
xj: (5)
Given the di¤erent R&D network architectures that may arise, the prots of an up-
stream rm Ui and a downstream rm Di are, respectively:
Ui(g) = [wi(g)  ci(g)] qi(g)  [xi(g)]2 ; and (6)
Di(g) = [p(g)  wi(g)] qi(g): (7)
Note that wi(g)  ci(g), i.e. the di¤erence between the input price and the production
cost of rm Ui, captures Uis prot margin per unit of input sold to rm Di. Similarly,
p(g)  wi(g) reects Dis prot margin per unit of nal good sold to consumers.
3.1 Sequence of moves
We consider the following four-stage game. In the rst stage (R&D network forma-
tion), the upstream rms choose simultaneously their R&D links. Four conceivable R&D
network architectures may arise from this stage (Figure 1, right panel). In the second
stage (R&D selection), conditional on the network structure, upstream rms decide si-
multaneously and independently their R&D investments, so as each individual rm to
maximize its prots. In the third stage (upstream price/quantity selection), the upstream
rms choose simultaneously either their wholesale quantities or prices. In the last stage
(downstream competition), the downstream rms choose their output levels.19
The sequencing of moves, which is standard in the R&D network literature, reects
that the selection of collaborative links (stage 1) is a strategic long-run decision for the
19We retain the assumption that the product market is characterized by Cournot competition, which
is typical in existing R&D network models.
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upstream rms.20 This is consistent with anecdotal evidence that the establishment of
R&D alliances requires strong commitment from the participating rms (Hagedoorn,
2002, p. 479). The sequencing of moves further captures that the choice of the upstream
rmsR&D investments (stage 2) is a longer-run decision than the exact level of their
input prices or quantities (stage 3). This is because R&D activity is inherently uncertain
and thus may require a relatively long time to come into fruition; while input prices or
quantities can be changed more often and more easily, responding to changes in market
conditions.
3.2 Equilibrium concepts
We solve the game backwards from stage 4 (downstream competition) to stage 2 (R&D
selection). Then we turn to the rst stage for which we obtain the set of stablenetworks.
To this end we use two well-established equilibrium concepts pairwise stabilityand
strong stability.
Following Jackson and Wolinsky (1996), a network is pairwise stable if no rm has
an incentive to delete unilaterally one of its R&D links and no pair of rms want to add
a new link between them (with one beneting strictly and the other at least weakly).
If networks can be ordered in the following way fempty, partial, star, completeg, then
pairwise stability permits deviation to a neighboringnetwork architecture.
Pairwise stability considers deviations by one pair of rms at a time.21 This suggests
that if we enrich the network formation process to encompass deviations by a coalition
of rms, then it may no longer be the case that the same network architectures will
materialize in equilibrium. Indeed, it may well be the case that a pairwise stable network
is no longer strongly stable. More specically, we say that a network is strongly stable a
concept due to Jackson and Van de Nouweland (2005) if it survives all possible changes
in the number of its links by any coalition of agents, because at least one member of the
20Indeed, in stage 1 the upstream rms anticipate the subsequent e¤ects of their network formation
decisions on R&D investments, input prices/quantities and output quantities.
21Pairwise stability can be seen as a necessary condition for stability (see Jackson and Wolinsky, 1996;
Goyal and Moraga-González, 2001).
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coalition would be worse o¤ and blockthe deviation. This constitutes a renement of
the set of pairwise stable networks.
4 Equilibrium R&D networks
In this section we derive the equilibrium of the entire game. Thus we proceed to solve
stage 1, the R&D network formation stage, by applying the concepts of pairwise stability
and strong stability.
Exploiting the symmetries across rms, we adopt the following notation for equilib-
rium prots throughout:
E denotes a rms prots in the empty network;
I denotes the prots of an insider (linked) rm in the partial network;
O denotes the prots of outsider (isolated) rm in the partial network;
H denotes the hub rms prots in the star network;
S denotes a spoke rms prots in the star network; and
C denotes a rms prots in the complete network.
4.1 An upstream price setting
The following Proposition characterizes the upstream rmsdecision to form R&D links
under a price setting.
Proposition 1 When upstream rms set prices, the complete network is the unique pair-
wise stable and strongly stable network.
For all levels of spillovers  within a network, the upstream rmsprots are ranked
as follows:22
H > C > I > S > E > O. (8)
22Equilibrium outcomes for R&D investments and prots are reported in Appendix A. Relevant plots
are also available on request.
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The ranking above implies that a rm in the empty network earns less than a spoke in
the star (S > E), but more than the isolated rm in the partial (E > O) because
the latter, outsider rm, is in a weaker competitive position vis-à-vis its rivals. Likewise,
the hub in the star network earns more than any of the rms in the complete network
(H > C). Finally, notice that C > I : a rm in the complete network performs
better than an insider (linked) rm in the partial network.
The intuition behind this last condition can be explained as follows. From stage 3
(upstream price selection) of our game, the reaction functions for input prices from the
viewpoint of a linked rm i and the isolated rm are, respectively:
wi(wj; w3;xi; xj) =
1
6
[a+ 3c+ wj + w3   3(xi + xj)], i 6= j, i; j 2 f1; 2g, (9)
w3(wi; wj;x3) =
1
6
(a+ 3c+ wi + wj   3x3). (10)
These reaction functions suggest that input prices between the linked rms and the
isolated one are strategic complements that is, @wi=@w3 > 0 and @w3=@wi > 0.
Consider a partial R&D network, where two of the rms are linked and one is isolated.
In that case, the linked rms, who enjoy superior access to lower costs through R&D, are
able to set lower input prices. The decrease in the input prices of the linked rms induces
the isolated rm to lower its input price because input prices are strategic complements.
But this harms the downstream counterparts of the linked rms by increasing the intensity
of competition between themselves. Thus, the linked rms will benet by expanding their
partial R&D network in order to relax competition between downstream rms. Putting
this last result slightly di¤erently, a deviation from the partial to the complete network
is protable for all rms involved, both the insiders and the outsider, because C > I
and C > O.
Using the prot ranking (8), Proposition 1 is then proved as follows. To show that
the complete network is pairwise stable, we require that C > S: a rm in the complete
network earns more than a spoke in the star network. From (8) we observe that this
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inequality always holds and ensures that no rm will unilaterally sever one of its links to
become a spoke in the star network. Intuitively, C > S arises because the spoke rms
in the star network su¤er a cost disadvantage relative to the hub, whereas in the complete
network all rms are identical. Therefore, the complete network is pairwise stable for all
, as Proposition 1 reports. This also implies that the star network is not itself pairwise
stable.
We proceed to show that the complete network is the unique pairwise stable network.
To this end, we note that, in the empty network, a pair of rms can improve their com-
petitive position by forming an R&D link because I > E. This gives rise to a partial
network, which includes two of the rms but excludes the third. Next, contemplating
a deviation from the partial to the star network, from (8) we observe that S > O (a
spoke in the star earns more the outsider in the partial) and H > I (the hub in the
star earns more than an insider in the partial). This implies that the partial network is
not pairwise stable. Thus, the complete network is the only candidate for strong stability.
Turning to strong stability, the rms in the complete network will not jointly deviate
to the empty network by severing all their links because C > E. Likewise, C >
I implies that two of the rms in the complete network will not force a deviation to
the partial network. Therefore, as Proposition 1 states, the complete network emerges
endogenously as the unique strongly stable network.
4.2 An upstream quantity setting
We now consider a quantity setting in the upstream market. The following Proposition
characterizes the set of stable network structures.
Proposition 2 When upstream rms set quantities: (i) The complete network is always
pairwise stable, and it is strongly stable if within-network spillovers are su¢ ciently low,
 2 [0; ], where   0:33. (ii) The partial network is pairwise stable and strongly stable
if within-network spillovers are su¢ ciently high,  2 [; 1], where   0:95. (iii) No
network is strongly stable if within-network spillovers are intermediate,  2 (; ).
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For all levels of within-network spillovers , the prots of the upstream rms are
ranked as follows:23
H > C > I > S > E > O if  2 (0; 0:33); (11)
H > I > C > S > E > O if  2 (0:33; 0:95); (12)
I > H > C > S > E > O if  2 (0:95; 1]. (13)
From (11)-(13) we observe that, under a quantity setting, the relative position of I
depends on the level of within-network R&D spillovers. In particular, I is lowest for
 2 (0; 0:33) and highest for  2 (0:95; 1]. As we demonstrate in the sequel, the variable
position in the ranking of I is crucial for the equilibrium properties of the complete and
the partial network as well as the ultimate choice of these network structures themselves.
We now elaborate on some aspects of this result.
Our rst observation concerns the condition I > C (if  > 0:33) that an insider
rm in the partial network can earn more than a rm in the complete network which
contrasts with a price setting, where C > I for all ; see eq. (8) . Intuitively, it
arises because, under a quantity setting, input quantities are strategic substitutes, i.e.
@qi=@q3 < 0 and @q3=@qi < 0; see eqs. (14) and (15). In particular, from the point of
view of a linked rm i and the isolated rm, in stage 2 (upstream quantity selection) of
our game, the reaction functions for input quantities are given by:
qi(qj; q3;xi; xj) =
1
8
[3(a  c)  4(qj + q3) + 3(xi + xj)], i 6= j, i; j 2 f1; 2g, (14)
q3(qi; qj;x3) =
1
8
[3(a  c)  4(qi + qj) + 3x3]: (15)
In the partial R&D network, the linked rms can achieve substantially lower costs
than the isolated rm due to their access to each others R&D stock. The cost advantage
of the insiders means that they can expand their input sales, which leads to a contraction
23Again, equilibrium outcomes are in Appendix A, and relevant plots are available on request.
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of the input sales of the outsider rm because input quantities are strategic substitutes.
In turn, the cost advantage of the insiders can be either strong or weak, depending on the
extent of within-network R&D spillovers. As a result, when spillovers are relatively high
implying a relatively strong cost advantage each insider rm in the partial network
will earn more than a rm in the complete network, i.e. I > C if  > 0:33. In other
words, unlike under a price setting, the insider rms in the quantity setting environment
will no longer expand their partial R&D network provided that spillovers are su¢ ciently
high.
Our second observation pertains to the condition I > H (if  > 0:95): the insiders
in the partial network perform better than the hub in the star network. This is a second
key condition behind the emergence of the partial R&D network as an equilibrium network
formation. The intuition behind I > H is fairly straightforward. Adding a link to the
partial network means that the hub gets access to the R&D stocks of the two spoke rms
but also shares its own R&D stock. In the partial network, though, the two linked rms
conceal their research outputs from their rival and thus fully internalize their competitive
advantage. Consequently, as long as within-network spillovers are su¢ ciently high, being
a linked rm in the partial network is better than being the hub rm in the star network.24
Having said this, we next turn to establish part (i) of Proposition 2. Pairwise stability
is implied by C > S; this also means that the star network is not pairwise stable.
Turning to strong stability, although the three rms in the complete network will not
jointly deviate to the empty network, it is the case that two of the rms in the complete
network will sever their links with the third rm if  >   0:33, because I > C in
the latter case. Thus, the complete network emerges as a strongly stable network only if
 < 0:33, as part (i) of Proposition 2 states.
We now show part (ii) of the Proposition. We rst note that I > E. Further,
we have that S > O, so pairwise stability also requires I > H . In turn, the latter
condition holds if within-network spillovers are su¢ ciently high, i.e.  >   0:95.
24That is, in Figure 1 (right panel), deleting a link from the star network benets the hub-designate
(i.e. rm 1) but harms the spokes-designate (i.e. rm 3).
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Therefore, the partial network is pairwise stable when spillovers are su¢ ciently high,
as part (ii) of Proposition 2 reports. Turning to strong stability, from part (i) of the
Proposition, we know that I > C if  > 0:33. This rules out the possibility that
the insider rms in the partial network will each form an R&D link with the outsider,
isolated rm. Consequently, the partial network emerges endogenously as a strongly
stable architecture when spillovers are su¢ ciently high, i.e.  > 0:95.
From the proofs of parts (i) and (ii) of Proposition 2, it follows immediately that no
network is strongly stable for intermediate values of the spillover parameter, i.e.  2
(; ). This result relies on the relative ranking of I and C and how this depends
on the magnitude of within-network R&D spillovers. Interestingly, we nd that there is
no smoothtransition from the complete to the partial network. This is a non-monotone
result highlighting the role played by R&D spillovers in determining the equilibrium
network architectures under a quantity setting.
Taken together, Propositions 1 and 2 suggest some additional observations. First,
the equilibrium R&D network architectures between the upstream rms depend crucially
on whether they set prices or quantities as well as on the magnitude of within-network
R&D spillovers. Second, in the context of an upstream quantity setting, the incentives
of upstream rms to form collaborative R&D links are non-monotone with respect to the
level of within-network spillovers (i.e. initially decreasing, then increasing), whereas under
a price setting the incentives to form links are not inuenced by spillovers. Third, the
equilibrium R&D networks might contain a larger number of R&D links under a price
setting than under a quantity setting, which appears to be the case if within-network
R&D spillovers are su¢ ciently large, i.e.  > 0:33. Interestingly enough, we also nd
that the preferences of the upstream and downstream rms regarding the formation of
R&D networks are largely consistent in the present setting. In particular, when the
downstream rather than the upstream rms choose the R&D links, we nd that the
complete network is the unique pairwise stable network under a price setting. Yet, under
a quantity setting, the partial network is pairwise stable provided that spillovers are
su¢ ciently large, i.e.  > 0:46; while the complete network is pairwise stable for most
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cases, i.e. 0 <   0:95.25
4.3 R&D investments
In this section, our objective is to investigate how the R&D networks, particularly the
strongly stable ones, a¤ect the aggregate level of e¤ectiveR&D.26 To this end, we begin
by analyzing how the di¤erent networks a¤ect rm-level R&D investments. The following
Proposition summarizes our ndings.
Proposition 3 When upstream rms set prices as well as when they set quantities, an
expansion of an upstream rms R&D network causes its own R&D investment to decline.
Moreover, an upstream rms R&D investment typically declines when the other two rms
establish a new R&D link between themselves.
This result can be explained intuitively in terms of two countervailing e¤ects. When
an upstream rm Ui forms a new link, it lowers its own costs by getting access to the
R&D stocks of its partners (e¢ ciency e¤ect). On the other hand, as a result of this new
link, the production costs of partners rms go down as well, which reduces the returns to
Uis initial cost reduction (competition e¤ect).27 As a result, the incentive to exert R&D
e¤ort depends on the relative merits of these two e¤ects. It turns out that the competition
e¤ect is stronger and thus outweighs the e¢ ciency e¤ect. Therefore, rm Ui will put in a
lower R&D e¤ort when it forms new links. This pattern regarding a reduction in a rms
own R&D e¤ort also extends to the case where the other two upstream rms form a new
R&D link between them, for this leads to a contraction of the outsiders market share.28
These ndings highlight the presence of the typical free-riding problem (e.g. Kamien
et al., 1992) in collaborative R&D activity, according to which the existence of tech-
25The formal proof is available from the authors upon request.
26As usual, the extent of cost reduction is measured by total e¤ective R&D (e.g. dAspremont
and Jacquemin, 1988; Mauleon et al., 2008). This refers to the total amount of R&D output (or invest-
ment/e¤ort) that is applied to production that is, the sum of a rms own R&D output and the R&D
outputs that it can access through collaborative links.
27Recall that, in the present setting, the competition e¤ect between the upstream rms operates
through their downstream counterparts.
28We note that an exception arises in the move from the empty to the partial network when upstream
rms set quantities, provided that within-network spillovers are relatively low, i.e.  2 (0; 0:14]:
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nological spillovers allows a rm to free-ride on its partners/rivalsR&D investments,
and thus abstain from own R&D spending. The free-riding problem has also been iden-
tied in di¤erent contexts in the recent literature on R&D networks (e.g. Goyal and
Moraga-González, 2001; Mauleon et al., 2008).
The discussion above points to the following trade-o¤. On the one hand, more links
lead to lower rm-level R&D investments. On the other hand, more links imply that rms
enjoy greater spillover opportunities. Can this latter positive e¤ect potentially o¤set the
former negative and thus lead to a higher aggregate level of e¤ective R&D? In other words,
one might wonder whether the strongly stable networks, which are typically highly linked
formations (recall Proposition 1 and 2), can perform well in terms of aggregate e¤ective
R&D.
It can be easily established that the strongly stable architectures generally secure a rel-
atively higher aggregate level of e¤ective R&D.29 More specically, when upstream rms
set quantities, both the complete and the partial network are e¤ective R&D-maximizing
structures. A similar pattern also arises when upstream rms set prices, unless spillovers
are su¢ ciently high. The following Proposition summarizes.
Proposition 4 (i) When upstream rms set prices, the complete network maximizes the
aggregate level of e¤ective R&D, except if within-network spillovers are su¢ ciently high,
 2 [0:95; 1], in which case the aggregate level of e¤ective R&D is higher in the star
network than in the complete network.
(ii) When upstream rms set quantities, the complete network maximizes the aggregate
level of e¤ective R&D if within-network spillovers are relatively low ( < 0:57). For
intermediate levels of within-network spillovers (0:57   < 0:86) it is the star network,
and for high spillovers (  0:86) it is the partial network that maximizes the aggregate
level of e¤ective R&D.
Interestingly, Proposition 4 suggests that the level of network-specic aggregate ef-
fective R&D depends crucially on whether upstream rms set prices or quantities as
29Equilibrium outcomes for e¤ective R&D investments are given in Appendix A. Also, relevant plots
are available on request.
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well as on the magnitude of within-network R&D spillovers. The intuition is as follows.
When  is low, the aforementioned competition e¤ect is relatively weak. This means
that, under the complete network, the reduction in individual R&D e¤orts is o¤set by
the spillover-induced information sharing. As a result, the complete network secures the
highest aggregate level of e¤ective R&D. As  rises, the competition e¤ect becomes more
prominent and there is now an incentive for individual rms to reduce further their own
R&D e¤orts. This suggests that asymmetric industry structures, such as the star or the
partial network, become more prominent in terms of aggregate e¤ective R&D. Conse-
quently, the number of collaborative links that maximize the aggregate level of e¤ective
R&D decline with respect to the spillover parameter, .
5 Social welfare
In this section we consider the impact of equilibrium R&D networks on social welfare.
Our interest is in understanding whether market forcesgoverning network formation
will lead to an outcome which is also benecial from a social viewpoint. Clearly, such
analysis is important in framing the optimal technology policy for collaborative R&D.
We dene social welfare in the standard way as the sum of consumerssurplus, up-
stream and downstream rmsprots. Social welfare in network g is thus given by:
W (g) =
[Qm(g)]2
2
+
3X
i=1
mUi(g) +
3X
i=1
mDi(g), (16)
where Qm(g) =
P3
i=1 q
m
i (g) and m denotes a price setting and a quantity setting in the
upstream market. Substituting the relevant expressions for output and rm prots into
(16), we obtain social welfare for each of the four R&D networks when upstream rms set
prices as well as when they set quantities. In Figures 2 and 3 we then plot welfare levels
for the di¤erent networks.30 Under a quantity setting, dene ^ as the solution to the
30We use Mathematica 8 (see Wolfram, 1999) for the Figures, and set a = 4 and c = 2, which is
inconsequential in a qualitative sense (i.e. a   c is a scale parameter). Here we plot the equilibrium
outcomes for social welfare; while the exact analytical formulas are available on request.
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equation W (gc) =W (gs), where ^  0:71. Figure 3 reveals that ^ exists and is unique.
Inspection of Figures 2 and 3 gives us the following key result.
Proposition 5 (i) When upstream rms set prices, the complete network is always so-
cially optimal. (ii) When upstream rms set quantities, the complete network is the
socially optimal structure if  2 [0; ^], whereas the star network is socially optimal if
 2 [^; 1], where ^  0:71.
Perhaps the simplest way to understand the economic forces involved is to consider
each component of social welfare. A key idea is that both consumer surplus and total
downstream prots are maximized in the network that yields lowest marginal costs. The
reason is that lower marginal costs translate not only into lower input prices, but may also
cause product prices to fall as a result. If so, both consumers and downstream producers
benet.
As explained in the previous section (4.3), under a price setting, initially the complete
network (if  < 0:95) and then the star network secures lowest marginal costs. A similar
pattern also emerges under a quantity setting: rst the complete (if  < 0:57), then the
star (if 0:57 <  < 0:86) and eventually the partial network yields lowest marginal costs.
Thus, the number of collaborative links that minimize marginal costs decline with .
Welfare
gP
gS
ge
gC
b
Figure 2: Welfare levels under a price setting
On the other hand, total upstream prots depend not only on the extent of overall cost
reduction, but also on the market position of each upstream rm relative to the others.
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Thus, under a price setting, we nd that the complete network promotes total upstream
prots. Intuitively, in the partial network, the cost advantage of the linked rms is eroded
by their isolated counterpart, who tends to reduce its input price. Moreover, the complete
network contains more R&D links compared to the star or the empty network. As a
result, upstream rms earn higher total prots in the complete network than in any other
network. Yet, under a quantity setting, we nd that apart from the complete network,
the star network can maximize total upstream prots but only if within-network R&D
spillovers are su¢ ciently high, i.e.  > 0:896.31 ;32
Welfare
ge bˆ
b
gP
gS
gC
Figure 3: Welfare levels under a quantity setting
The overall e¤ect of network formation on social welfare reported in Proposition 5
is determined by the interplay between the aforementioned three forces: (i) consumer
surplus, (ii) total downstream prots and (iii) total upstream prots. In particular, as
explained previously, (i) and (ii) move in the same direction but (iii) does not necessarily
31As it turns out, the ranking of total upstream prots (proof available on request) follows a very
similar pattern to social welfare. That is, when upstream rms set quantities, total prots are highest in
the complete and then the star network in other words, rst the complete and then the star network
is strongly e¢ cient. In contrast, when upstream rms set prices, the complete network is the unique
industry prot-maximising/strongly e¢ cient architecture. We conclude that total upstream prots and
social welfare yield qualitatively similar predictions regarding network e¢ ciency in the present setting.
32One might wonder which networks are Pareto e¢ cient in the present setting. We say that network g
is Pareto e¢ cient if it is not Pareto dominated by any other network; that is, g is Pareto e¢ cient if there
does not exist any other network g0 such that i(g0)  i(g) for all i, with strict inequality for some i.
Applying this denition, it can be easily established (proof available on request) that, under a quantity
setting, the complete and star networks are always Pareto e¢ cient, the partial network is Pareto e¢ cient
if  2 [0:34; 1], and the empty network is never Pareto e¢ cient. In contrast, under a price setting, the
complete and the star network are always Pareto e¢ cient, whereas the partial and the empty network
are not Pareto e¢ cient.
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do so. For example, under a price setting, it turns out that all three forces pull in the same
direction if  < 0:95, whereas for higher -values the e¤ect (iii) dominates thus, social
welfare is maximized under the complete network. Finally, we note that the intuition
under a quantity setting can be explained by following exactly the same logic as under a
price setting.
6 Discussion
In this part of the paper we present some ndings based on our previous analysis, and
also discuss briey a number of extensions of our model. Taken together Propositions 1,
2 and 5 suggest that when upstream rms set prices, there is a perfect correspondence
between market and social incentives for R&D collaboration. This is not necessarily true,
though, when upstream rms set quantities that is, there is a potential conict between
strongly stable and socially optimal networks. Such a conict between stability and social
welfare seems to be prevalent if within-network R&D spillovers are su¢ ciently high (i.e.
 >   0:33): the complete and the star network promote welfare but they dont arise
in equilibrium see Figure 4.
Thus, the key message is:
Proposition 6 (i) When upstream rms set prices, individual and social incentives for
R&D collaboration are always aligned. (ii) When upstream rms set quantities, there is a
potential conict between individual and social incentives if  2 [; 1], where   0:33.
In terms of policy implications, Proposition 6 provides support for a laisser-faire policy
if upstream rms set prices. In contrast, it highlights a role for government intervention
when upstream rms set quantities and within-networks R&D spillovers are su¢ ciently
high, i.e.  > . In that case, equilibrium R&D networks are under-connected from a
social viewpoint. Hence, our model suggests that policy makers should aim at actively
promoting R&D networks through the use of an appropriate subsidization policy (e.g.
through subsidization of administration and coordination costs incurred by the partici-
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pating rms).33 For instance, in this context, the provision of R&D subsidies seems to
assume a dual role. It not only supports the expansion of existing R&D networks (thus
reducing the likelihood of a conict between stable and welfare-improving networks), but
may also encourage collaborating rms to undertake more R&D investments.34 In turn,
the latter role of technology policy might be relevant particularly as a means of reducing
the typical free-riding problem in collaborative R&D activity.
gC is strongly stable
0 1*b bˆ **b
gC is socially optimal
gP is strongly stable
gS is socially optimal
0.710.33 0.95
Figure 4: The conict between individual and collective interests under a quantity
setting
As a caveat to the normative conclusions drawn above, we note that our model has
several special features that future work might seek to relax. In particular, in our baseline
model we have assumed that upstream rms have all the bargaining power to set input
prices. In reality however, upstream and downstream rms often negotiate over their
input prices. An interesting question is therefore to investigate the role of the bargaining
power distribution on R&D network formation.
33Subsidization policies for the promotion of R&D networks have been consistently applied in the Eu-
ropean Union (E.U.) and Japan. More specically, the relevant E.U. policy initiatives are based on the
establishment of a central science and technology policy as well as the subsidization of R&D networks
between country members under the umbrella of the Eureka and Framework Programs for Science and
Technology (see Marín and Siotis, 2008). For the relevant policies in Japan, see Branstetter and Sakak-
ibara (1998). On the other hand, the policy initiatives in the United States are near-market oriented and
R&D networks are judged on a rule-of-reason basis, where their potential static anticompetitive e¤ects
are weighed against their dynamic benet e¤ects arising from the R&D partnerships (see Hagedoorn et
al., 2000).
34Taken together, Propositions 4(ii) and 5(ii) suggest that R&D subsidies may help to increase the
upstream rmse¤ective R&D investments when  2 [0:57; 0:71][[0:86; 1]. Specically, within the former
range of  values, [0:57; 0:71], the star network maximizes the aggregate level of e¤ective R&D, whereas
the complete network is socially optimal thus, R&D subsidies may encourage the upstream rms in
the complete network to conduct more R&D. Similarly, within the latter range,  2 [0:86; 1], the partial
network maximizes aggregate e¤ective R&D but the star network is socially desirable.
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We note that the bargaining power distribution reects the relative importance of the
two market tiers, upstream and downstream. Thus, as the bargaining power shifts from
upstream input suppliers to their respective downstream customers, the ensuing input
prices become naturally lower. In the limiting case that suppliers have no bargaining
power at all, their respective customers receive the essential input at cost and thereby
suppliers earn zero prots. This in turn implies that suppliers will have no incentive to
collaborate in R&D, as there is no scope for further reduction in input prices. Therefore,
we can conclude that there exists a bargaining power threshold b^ above which the incen-
tives of suppliers to form R&D links would be su¢ ciently strong. Then, by continuity,
for a bargaining power above b^ our result on the stability of the complete network under
a price setting would persist in this variant with bargaining over input prices.
Throughout we have also assumed that each downstream rm has an exclusive re-
lationship with one upstream rm and purchases its input only from that particular
upstream supplier. We may now discuss in short the e¤ects of non-exclusive relation-
ships, where each downstream rm can select the cheapest supplier, or each upstream
rm may want to contract with several downstream customers. In this modelling varia-
tion, the results would be sensitive to the degree of input specicity namely, the extent
to which inputs are tailored for the specic needs of downstream rms. More specically,
when input specicity is zero, suppliers sell perfect substitutes and thus earn zero prots.
Notice that the incentives to form R&D links would then vanish altogether under a price
setting. In contrast, prots would be positive under a quantity setting, which implies that
incentives to form collaborative links would still be present but weaker with non-exclusive
than with exclusive relations. This line of reasoning leads us to a similar conclusion as
in the case above of bargaining over input prices, for a decrease in the degree of input
specicity corresponds to a decrease in bargaining power. That is, a su¢ ciently high de-
gree of input specicity would be requiredto relax competition at the upstream market
tier in order to restore rmsincentives to form collaborative links.
Finally, in this paper we have considered an industry consisting of three rms at each
market tier. As Goyal and Moraga-González (2001) have noted, a complete equilibrium
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analysis of R&D networks with an arbitrary number of rms is currently beyond reach.
However, the simple model employed here allows us to identify the following key mech-
anism. In essence, under a price setting, the strategic complementarity of input prices
harms rms with a large number of links relative to rms with a smaller number of links,
who benet from an increase in the intensity of competition. The intuition works in ex-
actly the opposite direction under a quantity setting: the competitive advantage of rms
with a relatively larger number of links is further reinforced because input quantities
are strategic substitutes. Thus, a quantity setting is likely to induce a smaller number of
R&D links relative to a price setting, as in our original model.
7 Concluding remarks
Although existing theoretical work has studied extensively R&D networks in one-tier
industries, the study of R&D networks in vertically related industries has received only
minimal treatment. This paper develops a framework for the endogenous determination
of upstream R&D networks that are actually observed in real world industries. Our
interest is to understand and analyze, as our framework attempts, whether the upstream
rmsnetwork formation decisions depend on whether they set prices or quantities, as
well as the implications of the resulting R&D networks for social welfare.
We rst examine the endogenous formation of upstream R&D networks. Under a
price setting, we show that the complete R&D network emerges in equilibrium. Yet,
under a quantity setting, the equilibrium R&D network depends crucially on the size of
within-network R&D spillovers. In particular, if spillovers are su¢ ciently low, a complete
network will arise in equilibrium. However, if spillovers are su¢ ciently high, the partial
network an insider/outsider formation will arise. This result suggests that the equi-
librium R&D networks might contain more R&D links under a price setting than under
a quantity setting so long as within-network R&D spillovers are su¢ ciently high. Thus,
the mode of the upstream rmsbehavior setting prices versus setting quantities plays
an important role in explaining the structure of the equilibrium R&D network.
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Based on this last nding, our analysis also suggests that in the context of an upstream
quantity setting, the incentives of upstream rms to form R&D links are non-monotone
with respect to the level of within-network R&D spillovers (i.e. initially decreasing,
then increasing). In contrast, under a price setting, the incentives to form links are not
inuenced by R&D spillovers. The interest behind this result is that it highlights the role
of within-network spillovers for the equilibrium properties of the network structures as
well as the ultimate choice of each network structure itself under the two di¤erent modes
of the upstream rmsbehavior.
We then turn to a comparison of equilibrium and socially optimal R&D networks. Our
focus is on the policy-related question of whether market forceswill lead to a socially
desirable outcome. Here our analysis conrms that equilibrium networks promote social
welfare under a price setting. However, under a quantity setting, we uncover a potential
conict: equilibrium networks might contain fewer R&D links than is optimal from a
social viewpoint provided that within-network R&D spillovers are su¢ ciently high. We
conclude that the mode of the upstream rmsbehavior (prices versus quantities) is as
important for designing technology policy as the size of within-network R&D spillovers.
Finally, let us remark that our modelling framework is fairly stylized, so care should
be taken in generalizing our conclusions. Despite its obvious simplicity, our model might
be useful as a building block that can support further developments in applied theory of
industrial economics. We have already discussed potential directions for future research,
such as bargaining over input prices and non-exclusive vertical relations. In addition, the
joint selection of the contract type (in the dealings between the upstream and downstream
rms) and the R&D network structure is an open question in this context. Another
issue, which is beyond the scope of present paper but constitutes a promising avenue for
future research, is to endogenize the extent of information exchange between collaborating
rms.35
35For studies on endogenous spillovers, though in a di¤erent context, see e.g. Cohen and Levinthal
(1989); Poyago-Theotoky (1998); Kamien and Zang (2000), Gil-Molto, Georgantzis and Rios (2005).
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8 Appendix A
In this section we present the equilibrium outcomes for the di¤erent R&D networks.
We note that the linearity of the model ensures that second-order conditions are always
fullled. For the complete, star and partial networks, the equilibrium outcomes are non-
negative for all values of the spillover parameter ,  2 (0; 1].
8.1 Complete network
Given the cost structures in eq. (3), in the last stage of the game, each downstream rm
Di chooses its output to maximize its prot given by eq. (7). The equilibrium of this
stage game, when upstream rms set either prices or quantities, is:
qi(g
c) =
1
4
(a  3wi + wj + wk);
Consider rst the case in which the upstream rms set quantities. Aggregating the
outputs of the downstream rms and rearranging leads to the inverse upstream demand:
w(Q) =
1
3
(3a  4Q) :
Given this expression, each upstream rm chooses its output to maximize its prot given
by eq. (6). The equilibrium upstream output and price of this stage game under a
quantity setting are:
qi(g
c; qs) =
3
16
[(a  c+ (3  2)xi + (2   1)(xj + xk)] ;
w(gc; qs) =
1
4
"
a+ 3c  (1 + )
3X
i=1
xi
#
;
where the symbol qs denotes the upstream quantity setting. Under a price setting, each
upstream rm chooses wi to maximize its prot given by eq. (6). The equilibrium of this
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stage game is:
w(gc; ps) =
1
28
[7(a+ 3c)  (15 + 6)xi   (3 + 18)(xj + xk)] ;
where the symbol ps denotes the upstream price setting. Using the expressions above, at
the R&D selection stage, each upstream rm maximizes its prot by choosing its R&D
investments xi. Let B  55   12 + 122 and C  409   60 + 362: The solution to
this stage game is:
xU(g
c; qs) = 3(a  c)(3  2)=B;
under a quantity setting, and
xU(g
c; ps) = 3(a  c)(13  6)=C;
under a price setting. We note that R&D investments (or outputs/e¤orts) are decreas-
ing in the spillover parameter . Substitutions reveal equilibrium upstream prots and
aggregate e¤ective R&D investments (XU(gc) = xUi + (xUj + xUk) = (1 + 2)xU) under
both types of upstream rm behavior:36
U(g
c; qs) = 3(a  c)2(37 + 36   122)=B2;
U(g
c; ps) = 3(a  c)2(2629 + 468   1082)=C2;
XU(g
c; qs) = 9(a  c)(3  2)(1 + 2)=B;
XU(g
c; ps) = 9(a  c)(1 + 2)(13  6)=C: (A1)
8.2 Star network
Consider the cost structures in eq. (5). Let D  1540+ 3240  17852+8103  2164
and F  256852 + 70032   272612 + 103142   19444: Following the same procedure
36We note that in the main body of the article we have used the shorthand notation i, where
i = E; I;O;H; S;C, to denote equilibrium prots of the upstream rms.
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as we did for the complete network, equilibrium outcomes are shown to be the following:
xhU(g
s; qs) = 3(a  c)(84 + 160   2252 + 543)=D;
xhU(g
s; ps) = 3(a  c)(13  6)(628 + 288   812)=F;
xsU(g
s; qs) = 18(a  c)(14 + 23   272 + 63)=D;
xsU(g
s; ps) = 6(a  c)(26  9)(157 + 57   182)=F;
hU(g
s; qs) = 3(a  c)2(28 + 72   272)2(37 + 36   122)=D2;
hU(g
s; ps) = 3(a  c)2(628 + 288   812)2(2629 + 468   1082)=F 2;
sU(g
s; qs) = 12(a  c)2(7 + 15   62)2(148 + 108   272)=D2;
sU(g
s; ps) = 12(a  c)2(157 + 57   182)2(10516 + 1404   2433)=F 2;
XU(g
s; qs) = 3(a  c)(252 + 856 + 1852   8103 + 2164)=D;
XU(g
s; ps) = 3(a  c)(24492 + 41072   63392   103143 + 19444)=F: (A2)
8.3 Partial network
Consider the cost structures in eq. (4). Letting G  385   138 + 692, H  64213  
7230 + 21692, equilibrium outcomes are the following:
xlU(g
p; qs) = 21(a  c)(3  )=G; xU(gp; qs) = 9(a  c)(7  6 + 32)=G;
xlU(g
p; ps) = 471(a  c)(13  3)=H, xU(gp; ps) = 39(a  c)(157  30 + 92)=H;
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lU(g
p; qs) = 147(a  c)2(37 + 18   32)=G2;
U(g
p; qs) = 111(a  c)2(7  6 + 32)2=G2;
lU(g
p; ps) = 73947(a  c)2(2629 + 234   272)=H2;
U(g
p; ps) = 7887(a  c)2(157  30 + 92)2=H2;
XU(g
p; qs) = 3(a  c)(63 + 10   52)=G;
XU(g
p; ps) = 3(a  c)(6123 + 2750   8252)=H: (A3)
8.4 Empty network
Given the cost structures in eq. (2), the ensuing equilibrium outcomes are:
xU(g
e; qs) =
9(a  c)
55
; U(g
e; qs) =
111(a  c)2
3025
; XU(g
e; qs) =
27(a  c)
55
;
xU(g
e; ps) =
39(a  c)
409
, U(ge; ps) =
7887(a  c)2
167281
, XU(ge; ps) =
117(a  c)
409
: (A4)
9 Appendix B
Proof of Proposition 3. When upstream rms set quantities, the result follows directly
from the comparisons xU(ge; qs) > xlU(g
p; qs) > xhU(g
s; qs); and xlU(g
p; qs) ? xU(ge; qs) if
 7 0:14, xhU(gs; qs) < xlU(gp; qs), xU(gc; qs) < xhU(gs; qs). Likewise, under a price setting,
it follows from the comparisons xU(ge; ps) > xlU(g
p; ps) > xhU(g
s; ps); and xlU(g
p; ps) <
xU(g
e; ps), xhU(g
s; ps) < xlU(g
p; ps), xU(gc; ps) < xhU(g
s; ps). Q.E.D.
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Proof of Proposition 4. From Proposition 2, we know that when upstream rms set
quantities, the complete network is strongly stable if   0:33, and the partial network
is strongly stable if   0:95. Then, for   0:33, we have that XU(gc; qs) > XU(gs; qs),
XU(g
c; qs) > XU(g
p; qs) andXU(gc; qs) > XU(ge; qs). Further, for   0:95,XU(gp; qs) >
XU(g
c; qs), XU(gp; qs) > XU(gs; qs) and XU(gp; qs) > XU(ge; qs). We also know from
Proposition 1 that when upstream rms set prices, the complete network is the unique
strongly stable architecture. Then, for  < 0:95, we have that XU(gc; ps) > XU(gs; ps),
XU(g
c; ps) > XU(g
p; ps) and XU(gc; ps) > XU(ge; ps). To complete part (ii) of the proof,
we establish that, under a price setting, the star network produces a higher level of
aggregate e¤ective R&D than the complete network whenever   0:95. To this end, we
note that XU(gc; ps) < XU(gs; ps) for   0:95. Q.E.D.
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Figure 1: Firm-Level Prots under a Price Setting37
b
Profits
CP
HP
IP
SP
EP
OP
Key: H denotes the hub rms prots in the star network; I denotes the prots of an insider
(linked) rm in the partial network; C denotes a rms prots in the complete network; S denotes
a spoke rms prots in the star network; E denotes a rms prots in the empty network; and O
denotes the prots of outsider (isolated) rm in the partial network.
Figure 2: Firm-Level Prots under a Quantity Setting
Profits
IP
HP CP
SP
EP
OP
b
*b **b
Key: As Figure 1 above.
37We use Mathematica 8 (see Wolfram, 1999) for the Figures, and set a = 4 and c = 2, which is
inconsequential in a qualitative sense.
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Figure 3: Total E¤ectiveR&D Investment under a Price Setting
gc
ge
gp
gs
b
0.95
Total “Effective”
R&D
Key: gc denotes total e¤ective R&D investment in the complete network; gs denotes total e¤ective
R&D investment in the star network; gp denotes total e¤ective R&D investment in the partial network;
and ge denotes total e¤ective R&D investment in the empty network.
Figure 4: Total E¤ectiveR&D Investment under a Quantity Setting
Total “Effective”
R&D
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gc g
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Key: As Figure 3 above.
Footnote 31: Total upstream prots (strong e¢ ciency).
We say that a network is strongly e¢ cient if it secures at least as high a level of
aggregate prot as any other network; that is, g is strongly e¢ cient if
P3
i=1i(g) P3
i=1i(g
0) for any other network g0. Application of this denition leads to the following
result.
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Claim 1 (footnote 31) (i) Under a quantity setting, the complete network is strongly
e¢ cient if  2 [0; ~], where ~ ' 0:896. For higher values of the spillover parameter,
 2 [~; 1], the star network is strongly e¢ cient.
(ii) Under a price setting, the complete network is the unique strongly e¢ cient net-
work.
Proof. Part (i): We use the equilibrium outcomes in (A1)-(A4) to nd total prots in the
di¤erent network architectures. Let ~U(gc; qs)  3U(gc; qs), ~U(gs; qs)  hU(gs; qs) +
2sU(g
s; qs), ~U(gp; qs)  2lU(gp; qs)+ U(gp; qs) and ~U(ge; qs)  3U(ge; qs). We
have that ~U(gc; qs) > ~U(gp; qs) > ~U(ge; qs) for all ,  2 (0; 1]. Also, ~U(gs; qs) >
~U(g
p; qs) > ~U(g
e; qs) for all . We next turn to compare total prots under gc and
gs. This comparison leads to ~U(gc; qs) > ~U(gs; qs) for   0:896, and ~U(gc; qs) <
~U(g
s; qs) for  > 0:896.
Part (ii): Using the equilibrium outcomes in (A1)-(A4), let ~U(gc; ps)  3U(gc; ps),
~U(g
s; ps)  hU(gs; ps)+2sU(gs; ps), ~U(gp; ps)  2lU(gp; ps)+ U(gp; ps) and ~U(ge; ps) 
3U(g
e; ps). The result follows by noting that ~U(gc; ps) > ~U(gs; ps) > ~U(gp; ps)
> ~U(g
e; ps) for all , i.e. gc is the unique strongly e¢ cient network. Q.E.D.
Footnote 32: Pareto e¢ ciency.
We say that network g is Pareto e¢ cient if it is not Pareto dominated by any other
network; that is, g is Pareto e¢ cient if there does not exist any other network g0 such
that i(g0)  i(g) for all i, with strict inequality for some i. We then establish the
following result.
Claim 2 (footnote 32) (i) Under a quantity setting, the complete and star networks
are always Pareto e¢ cient. The partial network is Pareto e¢ cient if  2 [; 1], where
 ' 0:34. The empty network is not Pareto e¢ cient.
(ii) Under a price setting, the complete network and the star network are always Pareto
e¢ cient. The partial network and the empty network are not Pareto e¢ cient.
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Proof. Part (i): We begin by showing that the empty network ge is not Pareto e¢ cient.
This follows by noting that U(gc; qs) > U(ge; qs), which holds for all  2 (0; 1]. Next,
we show that the partial network gp is Pareto e¢ cient if   0:34. We proceed in two
steps. Firstly, consider the following comparisons: U(gc; qs) > lU(g
p; qs) for  < 0:34,
and U(gc; qs) > U(gp; qs) for all . These comparisons imply that whenever  < 0:34; a
Pareto improvement can be achieved by moving from the partial to the complete network.
Hence gp is a candidate for a Pareto e¢ cient network for   0:34. Secondly, we compare
rm prots under gp with the corresponding prots under gs. We have that hU(g
s; qs) >
lU(g
p; qs) for all ; sU(g
s; qs) < lU(g
p; qs) for all ; and sU(g
s; qs) > U(g
p; qs) for all
. Hence neither of the two networks, gp or gs, Pareto-dominates the other. Combining
steps one and two yields the desired result, namely, gp is Pareto e¢ cient if   0:34.
Finally, we show that gc does not Pareto dominate gs, and vice versa. This follows by
noting that U(gc; qs) < hU(g
s; qs) for all ; and U(gc; qs) > sU(g
s; qs) for all .
Part (ii): Sketch of proof. The proof follows the steps of part (i). The only di¤erence is
to show that the partial network gp is not Pareto e¢ cient. To this end, we show that the
complete network gc Pareto dominates it. That is, U(gc; ps) > lU(g
p; ps) for all ; and
U(g
c; ps) > U(g
p; ps) for all . Q.E.D.
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